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Abstract: Are vertical mergers e±cient or restraints to trade? This paper examines this long-
standing question in a new setting and reaches new conclusions. We consider a realistic envi-
ronment where downstream ¯rms can make speci¯c investments in several suppliers at once. In
keeping with the \Chicago School" of regulation, we assume inputs are exchanged e±ciently re-
gardless of the ownership structure. Nevertheless, we ¯nd that vertical merger can be ine±cient.
A merged ¯rm has an incentive to manipulate its ex ante investments to increase the ex post
revenues of its supply unit. It will increase its investment in its internal supplier and decrease its
investment in an external supplier relative to the e±cient level of investments. The \skewing" is
reinforced in equilibrium by other buyers who respond by skewing their own investments. The
result isa reduction in thevariety of inputs purchased by downstream ¯rms. We relatethetheory
to studies of vertical mergers in pharmaceuticals and cable television.
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support.I. Introduction
Economists, lawyers, and judges have debated for decades whether vertical mergers are e±cient
or restraints to trade. In this paper, we examine this question in a new setting and reach new
conclusions. We consider vertical merger when downstream ¯rms can invest in assets speci¯c to
suppliers. Our environment, with multiple ¯rms and potentially multiple speci¯c investments,
captures a reality. Firms invest, often strategically, in vertical supply relations.1 We ¯nd that,
even when downstream ¯rms compete for inputs and inputs are allocated e±ciently, vertical
merger can lead to ine±cient investments. These conclusions counter the basic argument against
regulation of vertical mergers.
The debate over vertical merger regulation concerns whether merger is ine±cient and harms
other ¯rms and consumers. One side of the debate, which we will call the \Chicago school,"
maintains that vertical mergers are neutral. They cannot lead to harmful vertical foreclosure,
where a merged ¯rm reduces input supply and raises prices to non-merged downstream ¯rms.2
In particular, Bork (1978) argues that a vertical merger does not change how a ¯rm decides
whether to make or buy inputs nor a ¯rm's incentives to sell inputs to other ¯rms.3 If there
are any e±ciency gains from merger, the purchasing unit will optimally favor its internal supply
source (p. 207). On the other side of the debate, a series of papers ¯nds that vertical merger is
not neutral when downstream ¯rms compete in the output market. Merger does indeed change
incentives to sell inputs to rival manufacturers [Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner, Salop (1990),
Hart and Tirole (1990)]. When, for example, ¯rms are Cournot competitors in the ¯nal goods
market, a unit of supply translates into an additional unit of ¯nal output capacity, and can harm
the pro¯ts of a merged manufacturer-supplier.4
1See, for example, Cawthorne (1995) and Uzzi (1996) for the textile industry, Nichiguchi (1994) for automobiles,
and Saxenian (1994) for software. Spencer and Qiu (2001) analyze relationship speci¯c investments within Japanese
keiretsu.
2Another issue in the debate concerns the impact on the ¯nal goods market. Consumers may also su®er from
reduced supply and increased prices.
3In his discussion of Ford Motor Co. v. United States, in which the Supreme Court prevented Ford from
purchasing a spark plug supplier, Bork(pg. 236) writes that \The structure of an industry supplying the automotive
industry will be whatever is most e±cient for the automotive industry. There can be nothing wrong in the
automobile manufacturers acquiring all of their suppliers. The decision to make onself or to buy from others is
always made on the basis of di®erence in cost and e®ectiveness, criteria the law should permit the manufacturer to
apply without interference."
4A large literature now explains reasons why competition in the output market could change a merged ¯rm's
incentives to supply to a rival. See, for example, Ma (1997) and Church & Gandal (2000) and Choi and Yi (2000).
1We present here an argument that vertical merger is harmful based not on the ¯nal goods
market, but on the input market itself. We consider a Chicago school world where the market for
inputs is competitive, the allocation of inputs is e±cient, and a merged supplier sells to outside
buyers whenever their realized values of an input are higher than the value to the internal buyer.
In our analysis, we add the feature that ¯rms can make speci¯c investments that a®ect the value
of inputs from di®erent suppliers.
We ¯nd that vertical merger can be ine±cient because it a®ects ¯rms' incentives to invest in
speci¯c assets. A buyer that merges with a supplier will increase its investment in its internal
supplier and decrease its investments in an external supplier, relative to the e±cient levels of
investments.5 This\skewing"of investments increasesthemerged ¯rm's expected valueof internal
supply relative to external supply. This enhanced value in turn increases the expected revenues
the merged ¯rm will earn from outside buyers. Since the supply unit receives higher expected
revenues, the skewing of investments increases the merged ¯rm's pro¯ts. A merged ¯rm will, ex
post, purchase more from its internal supply unit. But the initial investments, which changed
the relative value of suppliers' inputs, are not socially optimal.
These ine±ciencies arise in equilibrium. In a general model with two upstream suppliers and
two downstream buyers, we ¯nd that merger between buyer-supplier pairs can be (but need not
be) an equilibrium outcome. A merged buyer ine±ciently skews its investments away from the
external supplier and towards its internal supplier. The other buyer also ine±ciently skews its
investments, whether or not this buyer is itself merged. Merger is always ine±cient, and two
mergers lead to more skewed investments than one merger. The ine±ciency causes a reduction
in the variety of inputs that buyers use to produce ¯nal goods. In a model with more than two
buyers and sellers, we ¯nd that merger is always ine±cient although the nature of the distortion
on external investments is ambiguous. Hence, in contrast to the Chicago school, mergers can
reduce welfare.
This analysiscombines themesof three literatures. Theliteratureon vertical foreclosure, cited
above, considers how merger a®ects thesupply of inputs and input prices. A second literature, on
incompletecontracting, considershow ownership a®ects incentivesto invest in speci¯cassets (e.g.,
5In a model with one buyer and two suppliers, Segal and Whinston (2000) examine how an exclusive dealing
contract a®ects investment incentives. Their problem is di®erent, but theydistinguish between external and internal
investments in a related way.
2Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore(1990), Bolton and Whinston (1993)). Thisliterature
highlights how speci¯c assets a®ects ¯rms' ex post bargaining positions. A third literature, on
networks, considers links or relationships among multiple agents [e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), Kranton and Minehart (2001)]. Ingredients from each literature
appear in our modeling. We consider how vertical merger a®ects input prices and sales when
downstream ¯rms invest in speci¯c assets to potentially multiple suppliers.
In our list of references, Bolton and Whinston's (1993) analysis demands particular attention.
They consider vertical merger in a model with two downstream ¯rms and one upstream ¯rm,
where a downstream ¯rm can make a speci¯c investment in the upstream ¯rm. They ¯nd, as we
do, that a merged ¯rm overinvests in the asset speci¯c to the supplier. In their analysis of two
downstream and two upstream ¯rms, they restrict a downstream¯rm to invest in a singlesupplier.
Vertical mergers lead to e±cient investments, since merger eliminates a hold-up problem for each
pair of ¯rms. In contrast, weconsider downstream ¯rms that can invest in multiple suppliers and
¯nd that any merger is ine±cient.
Our analysis identi¯es supply-stealing and supply-freeing e®ects of multiple speci¯c invest-
ments and studies the implication for merger incentives. A downstream ¯rm that increases its
investment in a supplier steals supply from other buyers. The expected price of this supplier will
rise. A downstream ¯rm that decreases an investment in a supplier frees supply for other buyers.
The expected price of this seller will fall. A merged ¯rm takes advantage of the supply stealing
e®ects: it increases its investment in its internal seller and decreases investment in external sell-
ers. It therefore raises the demand for its supply unit's capacity and raises the expected revenues
earned by the supply unit. Other buyers are hurt by the merger and change in investments.
We consider the equilibrium properties of ¯rms' investments. Because of the supply freeing
and stealing e®ects, buyers' investments in the same supplier are strategic substitutes and in-
vestments in di®erent suppliers are strategic complements. There are therefore potentially many
equilibria in an investment game for a given ownership structure. Nevertheless, we are able to
compare equilibria across ownership structures using the theory of monotone comparative statics
of Milgrom and Roberts [1990]. We show in our basic model that each merger leads to further
skewing of investments away from external suppliers.
Our results yield insights into vertical foreclosure and the e®ect of ownership on investments.
3In our model, ownership a®ects investments not because of hold-up, but because investments
change the value and allocation of inputs and input prices. Indeed, in contrast to the literature
on incomplete contracting, merger leads to ine±cient investments. A merged ¯rm over-invests in
some speci¯c assets and under-invests in others. Relative to the vertical foreclosure literature, we
¯nd new incentives for merger. Firms merge in order to bene¯t from changes in speci¯c invest-
ments. The result raises questions about the traditional \supply assurance" incentive for merger.
In our model, the merged ¯rm reduces its access to outside supply. As for the regulatory debate,
we ¯nd that even in a Chicago world, where inputs are allocated e±ciently and manufacturers
do not compete in the output market, vertical merger can lead to ine±cient outcomes.
The analysis may o®er a new perspective on recent merger activity. In the early 1990s, for
example, therewas a waveof mergersbetween pharmacy bene¯t management companies (PBM's)
and pharmaceutical suppliers.6 Our results suggest these mergers may have a®ected incentives
for speci¯c investments which changethe relative valueof drugs from di®erent suppliers. PBM's,
such as Merck-Medco, operatepharmaceutical bene¯t plansforemployersand health management
organizations. Like the downstream ¯rms in our model, they do not compete for consumers in
the short-run. Their client base is ¯xed; a consumer can obtain her pharmacy bene¯ts only from
the PBM that has contracted with her employer. PBM's construct formularies (lists of drugs
included in the bene¯t plan) as well as health management protocols which advise the use of
certain combinations of drugs and therapies to battle certain diseases. Throughout the 1990's
regulatory authorities were concerned that merged PBM's would favor their parent companies'
drugs. The Federal Trade Commision ordered Merck-Medco in 1998, for example, \to take steps
to diminish thee®ects of unwarranted preferencethat might be given to Merck's drugs over those
of Merck's competitors."7 TheFTC's order concernstheex post distribution and pricing of drugs.
It ignores the speci¯c investments that could change a PBM's preference for a supplier's drugs.
In particular, speci¯c investments to learn the properties of a parent company's drug can make
6Merck purchased Medco (a PBM) in November 1993 for $6.6 billion. Subsequently, SmithKline purchased
Diversi¯ed Pharmaceutical Services (DPS) in May 1994 for $2.3 billion and Eli Lilly purchased PCS Health Sytems
in November 1994 for $4.1 billion. In 1994 other pharmaceutical companies formed strategic alliances with di®erent
PBM's. See Rangan and Bell (1998). To date, SmithKline and Eli Lilly have both sold their PBM units. For
detailed discussions of mergers between pharmaceutical suppliers and pharmacy bene¯t managment companies see,
for example, Ragan and Bell (1998), Levy (1999, Chapters II and V), Food and Drug Administration Report (2001,
Attachment G ).
7Federal Trade Commission (1998, p.1). A similar consent agreement preceded the Eli Lilly Merger-PCS merger
in 1995 (Federal Trade Commission, 1995).
4that drug more valuable independently or as part of health management protocol.8 Ex post,
the PBM would then optimally feature the parent company's drugs. As we show here, however,
the investments themselves could be sub-optimal. In the conclusion, we discuss further vertical
mergers in pharmaceuticals and other industries.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present a basic model with two down-
stream ¯rms and two suppliers that shows our main results: a merged ¯rm over-invests in assets
speci¯c to its internal supplier and under-invests in assets speci¯c to external suppliers. Firms
have an incentive to merge to bene¯t from manipulating these speci¯c investments. Each addi-
tional merger reduces welfare, and merger occurs in equilibrium. In Section III we extend our
resultstoa general model of two downstream ¯rmsand two suppliers; Section IV considers greater
numbers of ¯rms and Section V discusses the robustness of our results to di®erent speci¯cations
of the model. We conclude in Section VI.
II. An Example for Two Buyers and Two Sellers
There are two downstream units, which we will call buyers, and two upstream units, which we
will call sellers. Each seller has the capacity to produce one indivisible unit of an input at zero
marginal cost, and each buyer demands one indivisible unit of an input. Inputs are made-to-
order, and buyers compete to purchase inputs. We suppose that buyers can have di®erent and
random valuations for inputs from di®erent sellers. This uncertainty re°ects, for example, ¯nal
consumers' demand forvariety. Buyers may sell several goods in the¯nal good markets, orseveral
varieties of the same good (e.g. di®erent drugs or di®erent models of cars) and have demand for
di®erent inputs depending on the ultimate realization of consumer demand.
Weassumethat speci¯cinvestmentsaremadebeforetheuncertainty over buyers' valuationsis
resolved. That is, buyers make long-run investments in anticipation of future, short-run demand
for inputs. This assumption captures many industries where investments are of longer duration
than the day-to-day or month-to-month °uctuations in consumer demand.9
8Medco took on several Merck managers with clinical expertise [Ragan and Bell (1998), pg. 17], and Merck-
Medco invested $120 million on information technology to develop health management protocols.
9Examples include pharmaceuticals and cable television which we discuss in the conclusion, as well as the
garment industry (Uzzi, 1996), electronics and engineering (Nishiguchi, 1994, and Lorenz, 1989), and toys ("The
Puppet-master of Toytown," p.88, Economist, September 6, 1997).
5A. A Merger Game
We consider a three-stage non-cooperative game. In the ¯rst stage, ¯rms make merger decisions.
In the second stage, buyers invest in assets speci¯c to sellers.10 The investments determine
the distributions of buyers' valuations for sellers' inputs. In the ¯nal stage, buyers learn their
valuations and production and exchange takes place. This set-up assumes ¯rms can not use long-
term contingent contracts to assign investments, future prices, or allocations of goods. The model
thus embodies the standard Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) incomplete
contractsframework: agentsmust makeinvestmentsbeforeuncertainty is resolved, and contingent
contracts are not possible.
We consider vertical mergers of single buyers and sellers. In keeping with Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore(1990), weassume that ownership does not directly a®ect theproduction
technology. That is, a merged seller can produce an input for its merged buyer or another buyer.
Ownership will a®ect investment incentives, however, and we will contrast the investments of
merged buyers and independent buyers. We assume that a merged buyer has claim to both its
revenues and its merged seller's revenues. Therefore, when a buyer i is merged with seller j,
buyer i chooses investments to maximize the joint pro¯ts of buyer i and seller j. When a buyer
i is not merged, it maximizes only its own pro¯ts.
StageOne: Firms simultaneously decidewhetheror not to merge vertically. At the end of this
stage, the ownership structure is common knowledge. We will consider, without lossof generality,
mergersbetween buyer1 and seller 1, and mergersbetween buyer2 and seller 2. Weassumea pair
will merge if and only if the merged ¯rm's pro¯ts exceeds the sum of their individual un-merged
pro¯ts, given the merger decision of the other pair.11 Three possible ownership structures can
emerge. In no merger, no ¯rms are merged. In partial merger, one pair is merged. In full merger,
both pairs are merged. For partial merger, without loss of generality, we will consider that buyer
1 and seller 1 are merged.
StageTwo: Given theownership structure, buyers simultaneously choose speci¯c investments
to sellers. At the end of this stage, all investments are common knowledge. Let 0 · gij · 1
denote buyer i's investment in seller j. With this notation we capture a buyer's investment in
10Later, we discuss the alternative possibility that sellers invest in assets speci¯c to buyers.
11The results, therefore, do not depend on bargaining and how gains from merger are split between the buyer
and seller.
6any seller, be it a merged seller or an external seller. The cost to buyer i of this investment is
(gij)2. The lines in Figure 1 below depict the speci¯c investments between buyers and sellers.
Buyer 1  Buyer 2 
Seller 1  Seller 2 
g 22  g11 
g12  g21 
Figure 1. Speci¯c Investments between Downstream and Upstream Firms
Each speci¯c investment determines the probability that a buyer will have positive value for an
input from that seller in stage 3. Let vij be buyer i's value of purchasing an input from seller j.
Let gij be the probability that vij = 1
2, and (1¡gij) the probability that vij =0.
Stage Three: Buyers' valuations of goods are realized, and production and exchange takes
place. We assume that allocations of inputs are e±cient: buyer 1(2) purchases from seller 1(2)
whenever v11 +v22 ¸ v12 +v12. Otherwise buyer 1(2) purchases from seller 2(1). The price of
exchange for seller i is denoted pi. We do not posit an extensive form game of competition for
inputs. Instead, we consider core outcomes, and in particular, the lowest competitive prices that
sustain e±cient allocations.12 Seller i receives a price of pi =0 unless there is excess demand for
its capacity. Excess demand occurs only when both buyers have value 1
2 for an input from seller
i and value 0 for an input from seller j. In this case, seller i receives a price of pi = 1
2: When
a merged buyer purchases the internal input, the price is simply a transfer price. The transfer
12Buyers' valuations need not be common knowledge. When buyers' valuations are private information, the prices
we use here would arise from an ascending bid auction for this environment [see Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
(1986), Gul and Stacchetti (2000), Kranton andMinehart (2001)]. For the theoryof core, i.e., competitive, outcomes
in a pairwise setting, see Shapley and Shubik (1972), and Roth and Sotomayor (1990). If prices are competitive,
and if buyer 1 obtains an input from seller 2; then there is no higher price that buyer 2 would want to o®er seller
2 to induce it to sell it the input instead. Below we formally de¯ne competitive prices.
7price insures that the input is allocated e±ciently. A merged ¯rm will sell the input to the other
buyer only if it cannot do better by using the input itself.
Wesolveforperfect purestrategy Bayesian equilibria of thisgame. Weanalyzethegameback-
wards. Weconsider, ¯rst, second-stageequilibriuminvestments for di®erent ownership structures.
We then ask whether ¯rms will merge.
B. Investments for Given Ownership Structures
In thesecond stage, buyers chooseinvestments to maximize pro¯ts given theownership structure.
Pro¯ts are third-stage expected revenues minus second-stage investment costs. Let ¦b
i denote
buyer i's pro¯ts and ¦s













To derive these payo®s, we consider all possible realizations of buyers' valuations. With prob-
ability g11g12, buyer 1 values an input either from seller 1 or 2. No seller has excess demand,
so the sellers' prices are zero, and buyer 1 receives a payo® of 1
2. With probability g11(1 ¡g12);
buyer 1 only values an input from seller 1: With probability g11(1 ¡g12)g21(1 ¡g22); buyer 2
also only values an input from seller 1; so seller 1 faces excess demand. Seller 1's price is 1
2, and
buyer 1 receives a zero payo®. With probability g11(1 ¡g12) (1 ¡g21(1¡g22)), seller 1 does not
face excess demand, so seller 1's price is 0 and buyer 1 receives a payo® of 1
2. With probability
(1¡g11)g12; buyer 1 only values an input from seller 2. In this case, seller 1 does not face excess
demand and so has a priceof 0: With probability (1¡g11)g12g22(1¡g21); buyer 2 also only values
only an input from seller 2; so seller 2 faces excess demand and buyer 1 receives a zero payo®.
With probability (1 ¡g11)g12 (1 ¡g22(1¡g21)), seller 2 does not face excess demand and buyer
1 receives a payo® of 1
2: Buyer 2's and seller 2's pro¯ts can be determined similarly.
We consider second-stage equilibrium investments13 for the three possible ownership struc-
tures: no merger, partial merger, and full merger.
No merger. When no ¯rms are merged, buyer i chooses investments to maximize¦b
i, taking
13That is, we solve for continuation equilibria for each possible outcome of the ¯rst stage of the game. For
simplicity, we refer to these continuation equilibria as \equilibria."
8as given the investments of buyer j. The ¯rst order conditions for the investments form a system
of four equations. This system yields a unique equilibrium14 where
g11 = 0:1811 g12 =0:1811
g21 = 0:1811 g22 =0:1811
The buyers' equilibrium pro¯ts are¦b
1 = ¦b
2 =:0771; and thesellers' pro¯tsare ¦s
1 =¦s
2 =:0110.
Partial merger. When buyer 1 and seller 1 are merged, buyer 1 chooses investments to
maximize¦b
1+¦s
1. Buyer 2 is not merged and so chooses investments to maximize¦b
2. As above,
there is a unique equilibrium. Here
g11 = 0:2150 g12 =0:1658
g21 = 0:1728 g22 =0:1876
The merged ¯rm pro¯ts are ¦b
1 +¦s
1 = 0:0888, buyer 2's pro¯ts are ¦b
2 = :0763, and seller 2's
pro¯ts are ¦s
2 =:0101.
We see here one of the main insights of our analysis. Compared to no merger, buyer 1 skews
its investments to favor its internal seller. Seller 1 earns a positive price only when it faces excess
demand. By increasing g11 and decreasing g12; the buyer raises the probability that it will have
value only for an input from seller 1, and hence that seller 1 will face excess demand. We can see








which is strictly positive. Similarly,
@¦s
1
@g12 < 0. Buyer 1 will take advantage of this opportunity to
increase the demand for seller 1 and thereby increase their joint pro¯ts.
We also see the supply stealing and supply freeing e®ects and complementarities discussed
14For each ownership structure, we solve the system of ¯rst order equations numerically using Maple. We
use analytical methods to determine that the given solution is an equilibrium (the best reply functions are strictly
concave). Details are available on request. To con¯rm the completeness of Maple's numerical ¯ndings, we conferred
with the algebraic geometer John Little. He employed analytical methods (Cox, Little, and O'Shea (1991)) to
determine that the number of solutions to the system of ¯rst-order equations agreed with Maple's output. We
also ruled out any corner solutions.
9in the introduction. By increasing g11 and decreasing g12 - that is, by skewing its investments -
buyer 1 steals the supply of seller 1 and frees the supply of seller 2 from buyer 2. These e®ects
change buyer 2's investment incentives. Because of the supply stealing e®ect, buyer 2 ¯nds that















@g21 isdecreasing in g11 and increasing in g12. Similarly, becauseof thesupply freeing
e®ect, buyer 2 ¯nds that investing in seller 2 is more pro¯table; that is, the marginal return to
investing in seller 2,
@¦b
2
@g22; is increasing in g11 and decreasing in g12. Thus, buyer 2 will skew its
investments in favor of seller 2; even though the two ¯rms are not merged.
Full merger. When both pairsof ¯rmsaremerged, buyer 1 chooses investmentsto maximize
¦b
1 + ¦s
1, and buyer 2 chooses investments to maximize ¦b
2 +¦s
2: As above, there is a unique
equilibrium. Here
g11 = 0:2173 g12 =0:1600
g21 = 0:1600 g22 =0:2173
Each merged ¯rm earns a pro¯t of ¦b
i +¦s
i = 0:0870:
Hereagain we seehow mergera®ectsinvestments. Relativeto theotherownership structures,
both buyers skew their investments to favor the internal seller. This skewing raises the probabil-
ity that the internal seller earns a positive price. Holding the other ¯rm's investments ¯xed, the
merged ¯rm can thus increase joint pro¯ts by skewing towards the internal seller. However, be-
cause of thesupply stealing and freeing e®ects, theothermerged buyer also skewsits investments.
Full merger involves greater skewing than any other ownership structure.
C. Equilibrium Ownership Structure
Wenow solvethe ¯rst stageof thegameto determinetheequilibrium ownership structure. There
is a unique equilibrium: full merger.
We ¯rst see that the no merger is not an equilibrium. Buyer 1 and seller 1 have higher joint
10pro¯tsunderpartial merger.15 This result would beobvious if buyer2 chosethesameinvestments
whether or not buyer 1 and seller 1 were merged. Here, however, buyer 2 skews its investments
towards seller 2 in response to the merger. The skewing reduces the merged ¯rm's pro¯t, but the
change is not enough to deter buyer 1 and seller 1 from merging.
Wenext show that thepartial merger isnot an equilibrium. If buyer1 and seller 1 aremerged,
then buyer 2 and seller 2 will also merge.16 Despite the fact that buyer 1 skews its investments
in response to the new merger, buyer 2 and seller 2 are not deterred from merging.
Finally, weconclude that thefull merger ownership structure is an equilibrium, and therefore
the unique equilibrium outcome. If buyer i and seller i are merged, buyer j and seller j will also
merge. Buyer j's and seller j's joint pro¯ts are higher than in the partial merger case.









@g21 > 0: In fact, the joint pro¯ts are lower in the merger
case than in the no merger case.17 The game has the structure of a prisoners' dilemma. Both
pairs of buyers and sellers earn a higher joint pro¯ts under no merger, but only full merger is an
equilibrium.
D. Equilibrium Merger Reduces Welfare
Each merger reduces welfare through its e®ect on the investments. The welfare of the industry is




2. We ¯nd that, of thethree ownership structures,
no merger has the highest welfare and full merger has the lowest welfare.18
The equilibrium investmentswhen no ¯rmsare merged areexactly the e±cient investments.19
Thisoutcomeis not a coincidence. When a buyerpaysthelowest competitive priceforinputs, the
priceis equal to thesocial opportunity costs of its obtaining a good. Therefore, a buyer'srevenues
always equal the welfare contribution of its investments.20 Each buyer chooses investments to




1 , increase from :0881 to 0:0888.




2; from :0864 to 0:0870:




1 = 0:0881: This is larger than their









2 is 0:1762 with no merger, 0:1751 under partial merger, and 0:1740 under full
merger.








2 is maximized over (g11; g12; g21:g22) at
the no merger equilibrium.
20Formally, we say that the buyers' payo®s satisfy the Vickrey property. See our discussion in the proof of
Proposition 3.
11maximize welfare given the investments of the other buyer. To make this argument concrete,
consider one possible realization of buyers' valuations: v11 = 1
2; v12 = 1
2; v21 = 1
2; v22 =0. In this
event, in thee±cient allocation, buyer 1 purchases from seller2 and buyer 2 purchases from seller
1. The minimum competitive prices are p1 = 0 and p2 = 0, and each buyer earns payo®s of 1
2.
Total welfare is 1
2 +1
2 =1. Considerthe change in welfarewhen buyer 1 is not present (i.e., makes
no investments). Only buyer 2 would purchase an input, and welfare falls to 1
2. The reduction
in welfare is 1
2, which is exactly equal to buyer 1's revenues in this event. When considering its
investments, therefore, buyer 1's gains are exactly the gains in welfare.
When any ¯rm is merged, investments are not e±cient. A merged ¯rm's incentives are not
aligned with welfare because of the addition of the seller's revenues. The seller earns a positive
price only when both buyers compete for its ouput; that is, when the seller faces excess demand.
This competitive e®ect causes the merged ¯rm to skew the investments ine±ciently away from
the external seller. As discussed above, the other buyer skews its investments in response, even
if it is not merged. Thus, welfare falls whenever a ¯rm merges. Equilibrium merger nevertheless
occurs, because the merging ¯rm earns a higher pro¯t.
Hence we see that, contrary to Bork (1978), parallel vertical mergers can reduce welfare. In
our model, merger does not distort incentives to sell inputs. Ex post, the allocation of inputs is
e±cient. But merged ¯rms have an incentive to manipulate ex ante speci¯c investments.
Of course, thestark result that wehavehere-merger alwaysreduces welfare- isa consequence
of our assumption that the party making the investment earns the full marginal surplus of an
exchange. If weconsidered higherex post competitivepricesforinputs wherethesellerearnspart
of the marginal surplus, an unmerged buyerwould underinvest in thespeci¯c asset. This outcome
is the familiar hold-up problem, and merger might improve investment incentives. But we have
the problem of the second-best. Because there are potentially other speci¯c investments, merger
creates other distortions. Merger creates investment incentives in favor of the internal seller and
against the external seller. Whether merger improves welfare or decreases welfare would depend
on the relative magnitude of the hold-up problem and the incentives to skew investments. We
can, for example, parameterize the split of surplus so that buyers only earn a proportion q of
the marginal surplus of exchange and sellers earn the remaining (1 ¡ q).21 Above, q = 1 and
21Formally, we de¯ne the price vector (p1; p2) as p ´ qp
min + (1 ¡q)p
max where q 2 [0; 1] and p
min and p
max
12the buyer earns the full marginal surplus. We ¯nd for q = 3=4 merger still reduces welfare. For
q =1=2 the hold-up e®ect dominates, and mergers increase welfare.22
III. A General Model for Two Buyers and Two Sellers
Wenow show ourresultsarerobust to a moregeneral model of speci¯cinvestments and valuations
of inputs.
A. Buyers, Sellers, and Production Technology
As above, there are two buyers and two sellers. We now suppose the speci¯c investment gij is
some positive number and for each gij ¸0 thevaluation e vij is a random variable with support in
[0; v]. Thedistribution function Fij(vij; gij) is twicecontinuously di®erentiable with respect to gij
and vij, where fij denotes the density function.23 The distributions Fij(gij; ¢) areindependent for
all i and j. Weassume largerinvestments lead to higher valuations: for g0
ij > gij, the distribution
Fij(¢;g0
ij) ¯rst order stochastically dominates Fij(¢; gij). We assume further that fij(vij;gij) > 0
for vij 2 [0; v] and that @Fij(vij; gij)=@gij < 0 on an open interval of vij for each gij:24 Let
gi = (gi1; gi2) denote the vector of speci¯c investments for buyer i and G = (g1;g2) denote the
investment pattern. Each buyer i incurs an investment cost C(gi) =c(gi1)+c(gi2);where c(¢) >0
and c0(¢) >0: Let v = (v11; v12;v21; v22) be a vector of realized valuations.
We analyze a three-stage game like that described above. In the ¯rst stage, ¯rms make
merger decisions. In the second stage, buyers make speci¯c investments in sellers. In the third
stage, buyers learn their valuations and exchange takes place.
Further discussion is necessary only for the third stage. We again consider competitive (core)
outcomes. Allocations of inputs are e±cient; buyer 1(2) purchases from seller 1(2) whenever
are the lowest and highest competitive prices. Our analysis so far has assumed p = p
min or q = 1. The maximum




2 when at least one buyer has value
1
2 for input i. If neither buyer
values input i, then p
max
i = 0: In the next section we have more discussion of competitive prices.
22Another possibility is that sellers make investment decisions rather than buyers. When sellers earn the full
marginal surplus of exchange, i.e., q = 0, we have similar results to our basic model. Mergers cause sellers to skew
investments. Full merger is the unique equilibrium outcome and involves the lowest welfare. Calculations for all
these cases are available upon request.
23Formally, we de¯ne the distribution Fij(vij; gij) for vij 2 [0;1) and gij 2 [0; 1): However, as noted, the
support of Fij(¢; gij) is always contained in [0; v].
24These positivity conditions guarantee strict inequalities in some of our results, but are not needed for most of
them. The interval [0; v] may depend on gij:
13v11 +v22 ¸v12 +v21. Otherwise buyer 1(2) will purchase from seller 2(1). The price of exchange
istheminimum pricevector(p1;p2) that sustains an e±cient allocation of goods.25 Theminimum
pricesare uniquely determined by therealization v of buyers' valuations. When a buyer i obtains
a seller j 's good, buyer i's revenues arevij ¡pj and seller j's revenues arepj:26 A ¯rm'sexpected
third stage revenues are taken with respect to the distribution of possible realizations of v. Let
Rb
i(G) denote the expected revenues for buyer i and Rs
j(G) denote the expected revenues for
seller j.
We derive here the expected revenues for buyer 1: Buyer 2's revenues are obtained similarly.
Suppose v11 + v22 ¸ v12 + v21 so that in the e±cient allocation buyer 1 purchases from seller
1. Buyer 1 pays a positive price only when there is competition for an input from seller 1. In
this general model, competition occurs only when buyer 2 prefers an input from seller 1 to an
input from seller 2: that is, v21 ¸ v22: The minimum prices that sustain the e±cient allocation
are then p1 =v21 ¡v22 and p2 = 0. Seller 1's price is just high enough that buyer 2 earns more
by purchasing from seller 2. Buyer 1's revenue is v11 ¡p1 =v11 ¡(v21 ¡v22): Suppose now that
v12 +v21 ¸v11 +v22 so that in the e±cient allocation buyer 1 purchases from seller 2. Buyer 1
pays a positive price only when buyer 2 prefers an input from seller 2 to an input from seller 1;
that is, v22 ¸ v21. Theminimum prices here are p1 = 0 and p2 = v22 ¡v21, and buyer 1's revenue





[maxfv11 +v22;v12 +v21g ¡max fv21;v22g]f11f12f21f22dv11dv12dv21dv22:
We derive next the expected revenues for seller 1. Seller 2's revenue are obtained similarly.
Seller 1 earns a positive pricewheneverit faces excessdemand. As discussed above, thereareonly
two cases where this occurs. In the ¯rst, buyer 1 obtains seller 1's input, even though buyer 2
prefersan input fromseller 1 to an input from seller 2. That is: v11+v22 ¸v12+v21 and v21 ¸v22:
25A price vector (p1; p2) is competitive for an e±cient allocation if and only if : (1) If buyer i and seller j exchange
a good, then 0 · pj · vij and pj · pi (2) If buyer i does not procure a good, then pj ¸ vij and (3) if seller j
does not sell a good, then pj = 0: For each e±cient allocation, the set of competitive price vectors forms a lattice.
In particular, there is a minimum and maximum competitive price vector. If for some v, several allocations are
e±cient, then the e±cient allocations yield the same welfare and have the same set of competitive price vectors.
For these results, see Shapley and Shubik (1972), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), or Kranton and Minehart (2000).
26As previously discussed, when a merged ¯rm consumes its own input, the price is a transfer price that does
not a®ect joint pro¯ts, but does insure that inputs are allocated e±ciently.
14Seller 1's priceis p1 =v21¡v22:27 In the second case, buyer 2 obtains seller1'sinput, even though
buyer 1 prefers an input from seller 1 to an input from seller 2. That is: v12 +v21 ¸ v11 +v22 and












A ¯rm's expected pro¯ts in the game are its third stage revenues minus any second stage
investment costs. Buyer i's pro¯ts are ¦b
i(G) ´Rb
i(G)¡C(gi) and seller j's pro¯ts are ¦s
j(G) ´
Rs
j(G). If buyer i and seller i are merged, their joint pro¯ts are ¦b
i(G) +¦s
j(G):
B. Comparative Statics on Equilibrium Investments
In this section we show second-stage equilibrium investments are more \skewed" the greater the
number of merged ¯rms.
We comparesecond-stage equilibrium investments for thethree di®erent ownership structures
- no merger, partial merger, and full merger. A priori, it is not clear how to make such a compar-
ison since there could be potentially many equilibrium investment patterns for each ownership
structure.29 We can, however, use the theory of monotone comparative statics to prove our re-
sults. As de¯ned in Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 1255), a game is supermodular if each agent
i's strategy set can be ordered so that increases in j's strategies cause the marginal return of
i's strategy to rise, and, if the strategies are multidimensional, an increase in any component of
an agent's strategy causes the marginal returns of the other components to rise. Games where
strategies are strategic complements are typical examples. Games where strategies are strategic
substitutes can also be supermodular when the \reverse order" is taken on the strategy sets.
In our game, investments by di®erent buyers in di®erent sellers are strategic complements
and investments by di®erent buyers in the same seller are strategic substitutes. For example,
consider buyers' investments in di®erent sellers, g11 and g22. An increase in buyer 2's investment
g22 causes the marginal return to buyer 1's investment g11 to rise; that is,
@2¦b
1(G)
@g11@g22 ¸ 0 We ¯nd
27Here, we necessarily have v11 ¸ v12 and v21 ¡ v22 = minfv21 ¡v22;v11 ¡ v12g.
28Here, we necessarily have v21 ¸ v22and v11 ¡ v12 = minfv21 ¡v22;v11 ¡ v12g.
29We can see this possibility in our basic model of Section II. We assumed that buyers' valuations were vij =
1
2
or vij = 0: If, instead, we had speci¯ed vij = 1:5 or vij = 0, then the second-stage continuation game has three





@g11@g22 ¸ 0, so that the investments g11 and g22 are strategic complements
for both a merged and unmerged buyer. As another example, consider buyers' investments in the
same seller, g11 and g21. We have
@2¦b
1(G)




@g11@g21 · 0 so that g11 and g21 are
strategic substitutes for both a merged and unmerged buyer:
For independent buyers, these results are intuitive. They follow from supply stealing and
supply freeing e®ects. As we saw in the example, when buyer 2 invests more in seller 2, it
steals the supply of seller 2 from buyer 1. Since it demands a good from seller 2 more often, its
investment also frees the supply of seller 1. Therefore, themarginal valueof buyer 1's investment
in seller 1 increases and the marginal value of investment in seller 2 decreases.
For merged buyers, these outcomes are less intuitive since a merged buyer also considers
the pro¯ts of its merged seller. These latter e®ects may be quite di®erent than for the buyer.
For example, seller 1 receives a positive price only when both buyers prefer its input (v11 > v12








@g11@g22 ¸ 0: When a merged ¯rm obtains an input internally, the price
is a transfer. The merged ¯rm simply earns the value of the input. When g22 increases, buyer 1
procures the internal input from seller 1 more often, so the marginal return to g11 increases.
The next lemma shows that the second-stage investment game is supermodular for each
ownership structure. We provethis lemma by establishing the signsof thecross partial derivatives
of the merged and independent buyers' pro¯t functions with respect to appropriate pairs of
investments. The result follows from our ¯rst order stochastic dominance assumptions.30
Lemma 1. Foreach ownership structure, theinvestment gameissupermodularin theinvestment
strategies (g11; ¡g12) for buyer 1 and (¡g21; g22) for buyer 2:
Proof: All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
We now consider characteristics of equilibrium investment patterns. We will consider mergers
between buyer i and seller i. We say that an investment pattern G is more skewed than G0 if
and only if gii ¸ g0
ii; and gij · g0
ij for i; j 2 f1;2g. Our ¯rst result shows that for each ownership
30Notice that we take the reverse order on the investments g12 and g21: For example, to show supermodularity
for buyer 1's own investments (g11; ¡g12) requires showing that
@2¦b
1(G)
@g11@(¡g12) ¸ 0;which is the same as showing that
@2¦b
1(G)
@g11@g12 · 0:That is, buyer 1's own investments are strategic substitutes.
16structure there is an equilibrium and the set of equilibria is de¯ned by a most and least skewed
investment pattern. The proposition is a straightforward application of Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) and follows directly from the supermodularity of the investment game.
Proposition 1. For each ownership structure, there exists a (pure) Nash equilibrium of the
second-stage investment game. Moreover, there exist a most skewed and a least skewed equilib-
rium investment pattern.
We now show that investments are always more \skewed" as the number of merged ¯rms
increases. We begin with a lemma. We parameterize the ownership structure by t 2 fN;P; Fg
where N indicates no merger, P partial merger, and F full merger. The parameter t increases
as the number of merged ¯rms increases; i.e., we impose a partial ordering on t as follows:
N Á P ÁF. Firm i refers to either buyer i or the merged ¯rm composed of buyer i and seller i,
according to the ownership structure t. We have
Lemma 2. The marginal return to ¯rm 1's investment in g11 and in ¡g12 is weakly increasing
in t, holding the other investments ¯xed. The marginal return to ¯rm 2's investment in g22 and
in ¡g21 is weakly increasing in t, holding the other investments ¯xed.




@gii > 0 and
@¦s
i
@gij < 0: A merged ¯rm i therefore earns a higher (lower) marginal
return from internal (external) investment than does an unmerged ¯rm i.31
Our second result shows that equilibrium investments become more skewed the greater the
number of merged ¯rms and is again a straightforward application of Milgrom and Roberts [1990]
given Lemma 2.
Proposition 2. Consider the most skewed equilibrium when no ¯rms are merged. The most
skewed equilibrium investment pattern when one ¯rm is merged is more skewed. And the most
skewed equilibrium investment pattern when both ¯rms are merged is yet more skewed. Consider
the least skewed equilibrium pattern when no ¯rms are merged. The least skewed equilibrium
investment pattern when one ¯rm is merged is more skewed. The least skewed equilibrium when
both ¯rms are merged is yet more skewed.
31When buyer j merges, the marginal returns to ¯rm i's investments do not change. This is consistent with the
statement in the lemma that they weakly increase.
17Wecan explain therelationship between mergerand skewed investmentsby thesupply stealing
and supply freeing e®ects. The e®ects yield a feedback; when one buyer skews its investments
more, the other will as well. When buyer 1 merges with seller 1, it hasan incentiveto decrease its
investment in seller 2 and increaseits investment in its internal seller, seller 1. These investments
steal the supply of seller 1 and free the supply of seller 2. Although nothing has changed in buyer
2's holdings, themarginal return to buyer2'sinvestments in seller 1(2) has decreased (increased).
Buyer 2 will then also skew its investments. The equilibrium involves more skewed investments
for both buyers.32
C. Equilibrium Ownership Structures
Because we have not imposed much structure on the distributions of buyers' valuations, the
three-stage mergergame may in general have many di®erent equilibria. More than one ownership
structure might be an equilibrium, and for a given ownership structure, there are possibly many
equilibrium investment patterns. Indeed, because the game has strategic complementarities, the
existence of multiple equilibria seems a likely outcome in general.
A key question is whether we can expect merger to arise in equilibrium.33 Equilibrium of
the no merger ownership structure requires that each pair of ¯rms has higher joint pro¯ts under
no merger than under partial merger. Consider an investment pattern that is a second-stage
equilibrium under no merger. Next suppose that buyer 1 and seller 1 merge, and that buyer 2's
investments do not change. Then clearly, buyer 1 and seller 1 can choose investments in such
a way that their joint pro¯ts are at least as high as before they merged. Indeed, buyer 1 and
seller 1 can generally do strictly better than before.34 Therefore, if buyer 2 did not change its
investments in response to the merger, then no merger would not be an equilibrium. However,
by Proposition 2, buyer 2 does change its investments, skewing them towards seller 2: The next
lemma shows that this skewing response hurts the merged ¯rm.
32This reaction is also an example of the LeChatelier Principle. For a discussion of Le Chatelier's principle, see
Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Theorem 6 and Section III.
33As we show in the next section, e±cient investment patterns are second-stage equilibria for the no merger
ownership structure, but not for other ownership structures. Because of this, merger reduces welfare.
34From lemma 2, the seller's ¯rst order conditions satisfy:
@¦s
1
@g11 ¸ 0 and
@¦s
1
@g12 · 0. If the no merger equilibrium






@g12 = 0 , and if for example,
@¦s
1
@g11 > 0; then the merged ¯rm can do
strictly better by changing the investments.
18Lemma 3. A merged ¯rm's maximized pro¯ts aredecreasing in any skewing by theother buyer.
It follows that if buyer 2's response is su±ciently strong, then buyer 1 and seller 1 may not want
to merge, so that no merger can be equilibrium.35 Of course, merger would be an equilibrium if
this response is muted.
D. Ownership Structures and E±cient Investments
We show here that merger leads to ine±cient investments in the general game. We compare
e±cient investment patterns to theequilibrium investments under di®erent ownership structures.
E±cient investment patterns balance the costs of the speci¯c investments with the expected
gains from exchange. By taking the e±cient allocation of inputs for each realization of buyers'
valuations v, we can determine the maximal expected surplus from exchange, H(G); for a given
investment structureG.36 Let W(G) denotethewelfareof G; that is, H(G) minustheinvestment
costs:
W(G) ´ H(G) ¡C(g1) ¡C(g2)
We say an investment pattern G is e±cient if and only if no other investment pattern yields
strictly higher welfare.
We now show that merger reduces welfare in our game. When no ¯rms are merged, the
e±cient investment structure is an equilibrium of the second stage investment game. However,
when any ¯rms are merged, the e±cient investment structure is not an equilibrium.
We have
Proposition 3. In the no merger ownership structure, every e±cient investment pattern is an
equilibrium of the second stage investment game. That is, independent buyers make socially
optimal investments in links.
The result holds because in no merger, buyers' investment incentives are aligned with welfare.
A buyer's marginal return to its investment is exactly equal to its marginal social value, given
35We can see the possibility of no merger in our basic model of Section II. We assumed that buyers' valuations
were either vij =
1
2 or vij = 0: If, instead, we had speci¯ed vij = 1 or vij = 0; then the merger game has
two equilibria. No merger and full merger are both equilibrium ownership patterns. The no merger equilibrium
involves e±cient, skewed investments, and the full merger equilibrium involves ine±cient investments that are yet
more skewed. Details are available on request.
36We have H(G) =
RRRR
maxfv11 +v22;v12 + v21g¦fijdvij:
19other buyers' investments.37 This outcome is a consequence of the competition for goods. When
buyers pay the minimum competitive prices, the price a buyer pays is the incremental value the
other buyer would place on obtaining the good. The purchasing buyer then earns the di®erence
between its own value and the other buyer's foregone value - which is exactly the marginal return
to welfare when it obtains the input. For example, consider the following realization of buyers'
valuations: v11 +v22 ¸ v12 +v21 and v21 >v22. In this case, in the e±cient allocation, buyer 1(2)
obtains a good from seller 1(2), but buyer 2 prefers an input from seller 1. As discussed above,
seller 1's price is just high enough so that buyer 2 is willing to forego purchasing from seller 1;
that is, p1 =v21¡v22. Buyer 1 's revenue is then v11 ¡p1 =(v11+v22)¡v21: Welfare is v11 +v22.
Now consider social welfarewhen buyer 1 is not present (i.e., has no investments). Buyer 2 would
purchase from seller 1 and welfare would be v21. The change in welfare is (v11+v22)¡v21, which
is exactly buyer 1's revenues in this event. Hence, when considering its investments, buyer1 faces
incentives that match social welfare.
Merged buyers' incentives, however, are not aligned with welfare. As we have shown previ-
ously, a merged buyer will skew its investments towards its internal seller. A merged buyer i
chooses investments to maximize ¦b
i(G) +¦s
i(G). As long as the seller's pro¯ts are strictly in-
creasing in gii and decreasing in gij, buyeri will change its investmentsrelativeto the investments
when not merged. We have38
Proposition 4. When at least one pair of ¯rms is merged, e±cient investment patterns are not
equilibrium outcomes. At an e±cient investment pattern, a merged ¯rm could increase its pro¯t
by either increasing the internal investment or by decreasing the external investment.
IV. Greater Numbers of Buyers and Sellers
Weconsiderhere whetherthemain insightsfromthetwo-buyer-two-seller casegeneralizeto S ¸2
sellers and B ¸3 buyers.39







0), where G and G
0 are any investment patterns that di®er only on the investments of buyer i:
38The proposition assumes that the e±cient investment pattern involves interior investments. If the e±cient
investment pattern involves corner solutions (gij = 0), then the pattern could be an equilibrium when some ¯rms
are merged.
39As previously, buyer i makes speci¯c investments gij which determine distribution functions Fij(vij; gij). The
vector of speci¯c investments for a buyer i is gi = (gi1; gi2;:::;giS); and G = (g1; g2; :::;gB) is the investment
20Our main result, that merger reduces welfare, continues to hold. When no ¯rms are merged,
thee±cient investment structureisan equilibrium of thesecond stageinvestment game. However,
when any ¯rms are merged, the e±cient investment structure is not an equilibrium.
Proposition 5. In the no merger ownership structure, every e±cient investment pattern is an
equilibrium of the second stage investment game. That is, independent buyers make socially
optimal investments in links.
As in our previous model, an umerged buyers' revenues are exactly its marginal contribution to
welfare. Therefore, unmerged buyers choose investments e±ciently, given the investments of the
other buyers.
Asforthepattern of investmentswith morethan two buyers, we¯nd new incentivesformerged
¯rms to invest in external suppliers. A merged ¯rm will still want to increase the investments
speci¯c to its internal supplier, but might want to increase or decrease investments speci¯c to
external suppliers. With more than two buyers, there are potentially two outside buyers that can
compete with each other for thecapacity of a merged ¯rm. A merged buyermay want to increase
its investment in outside sellers in order to stimulate this competition. Suppose, for example,
that buyer 1 is merged with seller 1. When buyer 1 increases its investment in seller 2, it steals
seller 2's supply from, say, buyers 2 and 3. These two buyers may then both turn to seller 1 and
compete more for its capacity. It is possible that the increased competition from outside buyers
can more than o®set the decrease in buyer 1's own demand for seller 1's capacity.40
We have41
Proposition 6. When at least one pair of ¯rms is merged, e±cient investment patterns are
not equilibrium outcomes. At an e±cient investment pattern, a merged ¯rm could increase its
pattern. Each buyer i incurs an investment cost C(gi) =
PS
j=1 c(gij); and v = (v11;v12;v1S; v21; v22;:::;vBS) is the
vector of realized valuations. Further discussion is necessary only for the ¯rst and third stages of the game. In the
¯rst stage, we consider mergers between buyer i and seller i where i · B and i · S: In the third stage, the price of
exchange is the minimum price vector (p1; p2; :::; pS) that sustains an e±cient allocation of goods, where pj is the
price received by seller j. Our de¯nition of competitive prices is easily extended to this case.
40Because merger a®ects external investments in an ambiguous way, our skewing results (monotone comparative
statics) of section B do not generalize to this model. However, we expect that in many examples, a merged buyer
will reduce all or most of its external investments. The e®ect that leads a merged buyer to increase external
investments is (loosely speaking) subtle.
41If the e±cient investment pattern involves corner solutions (gij = 0), then the e±cient pattern could be an
equilibrium even when a ¯rm is merged. The proposition assumes that the e±cient investment pattern involves
interior investments.
21pro¯ts by increasing the internal investment. The e®ect on the merged ¯rm of changing any of
its external investments is ambiguous.
V. Other Extensions
Wediscuss here whether our results would change if we relax di®erent assumptions of our model.
In our basic model of two buyers and two sellers, we considered section II.D how our results
depend on thebargaining power of buyers and sellers. Those insights apply to our general model
as well. In particular, ourassumption of minimum competitivepricesassigns all of thebargaining
power to buyers. Alternatively, we might assume that buyers and sellers share bargaining power.
Independent buyers would then no longer choose investments e±ciently, and may invest too little
in a seller as in the classical hold-up problem. Whether merger improves welfare or decreases
welfare would depend on the relative magnitude of the hold-up problem and the incentives to
skew investments.
The main insights would also extend to a model where di®erent parties make investments.
We have assumed that buyers make investments. Alternatively, we might assume that sellers
make investments or that both buyers and sellers make investments. If sellers make investments,
then independent sellers will choose investments e±ciently if they earn all the marginal surplus
of exchange. (Proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.) Sellers earn all
the surplus when buyers and sellers exchange inputs for the maximum competitive prices. This
outcome would correspond to q = 0 in our parameterization at the end of section II.D. Merged
sellers, however, would also consider the downstream unit's revenues, and therefore not invest
e±ciently. Merger would again reduce welfare. If buyers and sellers both make investments, then
coordination problems can arise. A seller might not invest in a buyer because the buyer is not
investing in the seller, and vice versa. We might avoid this problem by using a solution concept
such as pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). However, because it is impossible to
award the full marginal surplus of an exchange to both the buyer and the seller, investments are
not likely to be made e±ciently even by independent ¯rms.
Ourresultsrely on competition forsellers' inputs, which arisein our model dueto thecapacity
constraints of sellers. The fact that a seller can produce only one unit of an input underlies the
competition in the input market. When two buyers both prefer a particular seller's input, only
22one will be able to obtain it. When buyers make speci¯c investments, they anticipate this input
market competition. The more a buyer invests in a seller, the moredi±cult it will be for another
buyer to compete for the seller's input. This supply stealing e®ect (and therelated supply freeing
e®ect on the other seller) would not arise if sellers were not capacity constrained. However, if
sellers have increasing marginal cost functions, versions of the supply stealing and supply freeing
e®ects of speci¯c investments should still obtain.
Finally, we consider how our results depend on the form of the costs for the speci¯c invest-
ments. We haveassumed that C(gi) =c(gi1)+c(gi2): More generally, a buyer's cost of investment
could depend on the collective investments of all the buyers, and there could be cost interactions
between a buyer's own investments. What matters for our results is that the investment game
is supermodular.42 With independent cost functions, the game is supermodular in part because
the cross partial derivatives of the cost functions are zero. However, more general cost functions
could also be compatible with supermodularity.
VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes vertical merger in a multiple ¯rm setting. Its innovation is to consider
downstream ¯rms that make speci¯c investments in several suppliers at once. In this setting, we
¯nd that vertical merger can reduce welfare. A merged ¯rm has the incentive to manipulate its
investments to increase the revenues of its supply unit.
This paper has implications for the regulation of vertical mergers. Antitrust law has been
concerned with the short-run e®ects of vertical mergers; that is, how merger directly a®ects
the pricing and allocation of inputs [Hovenkamp (1994, pg. 331)]. This paper suggests that
regulators consider the long-run e®ects of merger. Regulators have recognized that a merger can
improve internal investments and lead to e±ciency gains, but have not considered the general
implications of merger for investments. We show that merger changes the incentives to invest
in long-run speci¯c assets which determine the relative value of inputs from di®erent suppliers.
Merged ¯rms may make ine±cient investments to raise the demand for their supply units. The
result could be a loss in welfare and a loss in variety to ¯nal consumers.
42In our model, the maximizationproblems of ¯rmsneed notbe convex. Instead, asshownabove, the comparative
statics results are obtained using supermodularity.
23To make this argument concrete, let us return to the discussion of recent merger activity. In
the introduction we discussed vertical mergers between pharmaceutical suppliers and pharmacy
bene¯t managers(PBM's). Thesetwo typesof¯rmsmatch thebuyersand sellersin ourmodel; the
pharmaceutical suppliersarethesellers, and thePBM'sarethebuyers-asthey areintermediaries
between the pharmaceutical suppliers and retailers/consumers. Like the buyers in our model, in
the short-run the PBM's do not compete in the ¯nal goods market. Their client base is ¯xed;
a consumer can obtain her pharmacy bene¯ts only from the PBM that has contracted with her
employer. The input market, the market for drugs, is competitive, and speci¯c investments can
increase the intrinsic value of a supplier's drugs (as a PBM investigates, for example, the e±cacy
and side e®ects of a particular treatment). According to our analysis, a vertical merger would
increase a PBM's incentive to invest in assets or knowledge speci¯c to its parent pharmaceutical
supplier and reduce investments in assets speci¯c to other suppliers. These investments raise the
demand fortheparent supplier's product, raising thesupplier's revenue. Themerged PBM would
then (e±ciently) favor its parent company'sdrugs on its formularies and in its health management
protocols. Theinvestments themselves, however, may be ine±cient reducing the variety available
to ¯nal consumers.
A similar process may be at work in cable television.43;44 From the mid 1980's through
the 1990's there was a wave of vertical mergers between cable television operators and con-
tent providers. Cable television operators, such as Time Warner, provide cable television service
to subscribers' homes. They purchase programs from content providers, such as Cinemax and
The Movie Channel. The cable television operators correspond to the buyers in our model, and
the content providers correspond to the sellers. Like the buyers in our model, in the short-run,
cable television operators do not compete in the ¯nal goods market. For the most part, con-
sumers subscribe and can obtain programming only from a single operator at a time.45 Cable
television operators can make a variety of investments speci¯c to content providers. They often
43This discussion is drawn from information in Chipty (2001) and Waterman and Weiss (1997).
44Our framework may also apply to other industries. For example, in the 1990s, there were many mergers
between companies providing information technology services and freight forwarding companies (Clark, 1990).
In the 1980s and 1990s, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola acquired and consolidated many of their bottlers. Cadbury-
Schweppes responded by forming its own bottling company in 1998 (Moriguchi and Lane, 2000). In both industries,
the vertical mergers facilitated speci¯c investments between the merged ¯rms, and in the case of the soft-drink
industry, reduced the use of independent suppliers.
45Moreover, in many geographic markets in the United States, only one cable system operates.
24provide capital to develop new programming and provide information so that these programs ap-
peal to particular demographics. The operator can also promote a particular provider's channel.
All of these investments raise the value of the provider's content to the operator. Our analysis
suggests that a merged operator will have a greater incentive to invest in assets speci¯c to its
internal provider and lower incentive to invest in assets speci¯cto other content providers. Empir-
ically, Chipty (2001) and Waterman and Weiss (1997) ¯nd that integrated cable operators carry
their own content providers' programming more often than that of other providers. Consumers
subscribing to these operators have a smaller choice of programming.46 Our analysis indicates
this outcome may be e±cient, given the speci¯c investments of operators and content providers.
However, the investments themselves may be ine±cient and unduly exclude external suppliers.47
46Regulators have been concerned that vertical mergers can lead to reduced variety. One aim of The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, for example, was to ensure consumers' access to an
array of programming (FCC (1992)).
47Chipty (2001) argues that mergerscan increase overall welfare. The e±ciency gains from merger (e.g., reduction
in transactions cost, elimination of double marginalization) may outweigh the loss from reduced variety.
25Appendix
In various proofs we (1) take derivatives under integral signs and (2) apply the integration
by parts formula
R
xdy = xy j ¡
R
ydx. A note at the end of the Appendix shows that these
operations are valid for the equations we analyze.
Proof of Lemma 1.
No ¯rms are merged.
The second-stage investment game is supermodular if: (i)buyer i's investments (gii and ¡gij)
arestrategic complements with buyer j's investments and (ii) buyer i's investments(gii and ¡gij)
arestrategic complements with each other. Following Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990),

















@g11@(¡g12) ¸0. Analogous conditions must hold for buyer 2:
We show here that g11 and g22 are strategic complements for buyer 1:
@2¦b
1(G)
@g11@g22 ¸ 0. All
other cross partial derivatives of the buyers' pro¯t functions can obtained similarly. (Complete
computations for this and other proofs are available from the authors on request.)




@g11@g22 =0, the cross partial derivative






























We evaluate the bracketed expression using integration by parts. Let x = maxfv11 +v22;v12 +
v21g¡maxfv21; v22g and dy =
@f11





ydx, where y = @F11
@g11 and dx = @x
@v11dv11: (Note that to obtain y from dy; we must
integrate the function
@f11(v11;g11)




















The ¯rst term is equal to zero: By ourassumption on thesupport of Fij, forall gij Fij(0) =0 and
F(v) = 1 for v ¸ v. Hence, @F11
@g11 = 0 at both v11 = 0 and v11 = 1. Consider the second term.
Considerthefunction @x














































We evaluate the bracketed expression using integration by parts. We may apply the formula
R
xdy =xy j ¡
R
ydx where dy = @f22






















The ¯rst term is equal to zero because @F22
@g22 = 0 at v12 = 0 and v12 = 1. We show that the




The derivative of x with respect to v22 is @x
@v22 =
@F11(v12+v21¡v22)
@g11 · 0 if v12 + v21 ¸ v22
and @x
@v22 = 0 if v12 +v21 < v22: Therefore, @x
@v22 · 0: By our assumption of ¯rst order stochastic
dominance with respect to g22 (that is, for g22 > g0
22;:F22(v22; g22) ·F22(v22; g0
22) for all v22) we
have@F22
@g22 · 0. We conclude that @x
@dv12
@F12




























@v12 ¸ 0 and @x








One or more pairs of ¯rms is merged.
When one or more pairs of ¯rms are merged, the second-stage investment game is supermod-
ular if the cross partial derivatives of the merged ¯rm's pro¯ts satis¯es the conditions for super-
modularity. (We have just shown that an unmerged buyer's pro¯ts satisfy the supermodularity













@(¡g12)@g22 ¸ 0; and
@2¦M
1
@g11@(¡g12) ¸0 where ¦M
1 = ¦b
1(G) +¦s
1(G): Analogous conditions must
hold for a merged ¯rm 2:




@g11@g22 ¸ 0. All other cross partial derivatives of a merged ¯rm
can be obtained similarly.







































































and we can now see that
@¦s
1
@g11 ¸ 0 by our assumption that @F11





















The derivative of x with respect to v22 is @x
@v22 =
@F11(v21¡v22+v12)
@g11 . Using integration by parts
where y =
@F22(v22)
@g22 and dx= @x
@v22dv22 and noting that y = 0 at v22 = 0 and x= 0 at v22 = v21,








































Given our assumption that
@Fij(vij;gij)
@gij · 0 for all values of vij , it follows immediately that the




Proof of Proposition 2.
Theresult followsdirectly from Milgrom and Roberts(1990), Theorem 5. This theorem shows
that for supermodular games, there exist smallest and largest serially undominated strategies.
These strategies are pure strategies and constitute pure Nash equilibria. A corrollary to the
Theorem is that there exists a smallest and largest pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In our
framework, thesmallest and largest equilibria correspond to theleast and most skewed equilibrium
for an ownership structure.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The marginal return to ¯rm i's investment in gii is
@¦b
i







if buyer i is merged. Therefore, if
@¦s
i
@gii ¸ 0, the marginal return to the merged ¯rm i's investment
in gii is larger than the return to the independent buyer i. Similarly, if
@¦s
i
@gij · 0 the marginal
return to ¡gij is larger for the merged ¯rm. When t = P, buyer 1 and seller 1 are merged and
payo®s include both buyer and seller revenues. If seller 1's payo®s satisfy
@¦s
1




then themarginal return to g11 and to ¡g12 haveboth increased. For theunmerged buyer2; when
buyer 1 merges, the marginal returns to g22 and ¡g21do not change (holding other investments
¯xed). Hence, we can say that these marginal returns weakly increase. When t = F, buyer 2
and seller 2 are also merged. As above, if
@¦s
2
@g22 ¸ 0 and
@¦s
2
@g21 · 0, then the marginal return to
the merged buyer 2's investments in g22 and ¡g21 have both increased. For the other merged
buyer 1; when buyer 2 merges, themarginal returns to g11 and ¡g12 do not change(holding other
investments ¯xed).
In the proof of Lemma 1, we showed that
@¦s
1







@g22 ¸ 0; and
@¦s
2
@g21 ·0) can be obtained similarly.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The result follows directly from Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Theorem 6. This theorem
shows that for supermodular games, the smallest and largest serially undominated strategies are
nondecreasing functions of a parameter that corresponds to our parameter t: By Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, our gameis supermodular and satis¯esthe conditions of Theorem 6 and its corollaries.
Proof of Lemma 3.
The merged ¯rm 1 is hurt when buyer 2 skews it's investments provided that
@¦M
1
@g22 · 0 and
@¦M
1
@g21 ¸ 0;where ¦M
1 = ¦b
1 +¦s




@g11 · 0 and
@¦M
2
@g12 ¸ 0, where ¦M
2 = ¦b
2 +¦s
2: We show here that
@¦M
1


























where x(v) =maxfv11 + v22;v12 +v21g ¡maxfv21;v22g: We have that @x
@v22 = 1 if v11 +v22 >
v12+v21 and v21 >v22: And @x
@v22 = ¡1 if v11+v22 <v12+v21 and v21 <v22: Otherwise @x
@v22 =0.






















where x(v) =minfv21 ¡ v22;v11 ¡ v12g: We have that @x
@v22 = ¡1 if v11 +v22 > v21 + v12 and
v21 >v22: Otherwise @x
@v22 =0 (or is discontinuous).

























@g22 · 0; since by assumption @F22
@g22 ·0:
Proof of Proposition 3.
Weshow below that abuyer's pro¯ts satisfy theVickrey property, asin Kranton and Minehart
30[2001] Proposition 1, p. 491. That is: let G be any investment pattern, and let G0 be any other

















On the right hand side of each of the equalities above, thesecond term is constant with respect to
gi: Therefore, thesolution to the maximization problem is the same as the arg max of W(gi;gj).
That is, buyer i maximizes welfare given the investments of buyer j:
To ¯nish the proof, we show that a buyer's pro¯ts satisfy the Vickrey property. We prove a
slightly stronger property. Let G and G0 di®ern only on the investments of buyer i: Recall that
H(G) denotes the maximal expected surplus from exchange. Let H¡i(G) denote the maximal
expected surplus from exchange when buyer i is not allowed to obtain any inputs. We show that
Rb







= H(G) ¡H(G0) ¡C(gi) +C(g0
i)
= W(G) ¡W(G0)
The second equality above follows from the fact that H¡i(G) =H¡i(G0):
We show that Rb
i(G) =H(G)¡H¡i(G): It su±ces to show that for each realized valuation v
of buyers' valuations, buyer i's revenue equals the di®erence between the surplus of the e±cient
allocation and the maximal surplus that would arise if buyer i did not obtain an input. This is a
property of the minimum competitive prices and is easily checked. For example, suppose that at
the e±cient allocation, buyer 1 obtains a good from seller 1 and there is excess demand for the
capacity of seller 1. Thishappens when v11+v22 ¸v12+v21 and v21 > v22: Buyer1'spriceis then
p1 =v21¡v22;and buyer 1 's revenue is v11¡p1 = (v11+v22)¡v21: Here (v11 +v22) is the surplus
of the e±cient allocation and v21 isthemaximal surplusthat would arise if buyer1 did not obtain
31an input. As another example, suppose again that buyer 1 obtains a good from seller 1, but that
there is no excess demand for the capacity of seller 1. This happens when v11 +v22 ¸ v12 +v21
and v21 · v22: Buyer 1's price is then p1 = 0; and buyer 1's revenue is v11 = (v11 +v22) ¡v22:
Here(v11+v22) is thesurplus of the e±cient allocation and v22 is the maximal surplus that would
arise if buyer 1 did not obtain an input. A similar analysis applies when buyer 1 obtains a good
from seller 2. We conclude that buyer 1's revenue is always the di®erence between the surplus
of the e±cient allocation and the maximial surplus that would arise if buyer 1 did not obtain an
input. Taking expectations gives the result that Rb
1(G) =H(G) ¡H¡1(G):
Proof of Proposition 4.
From Proposition 3, we know that e±cient investments are an equilibrium of the second-stage
investment game when no ¯rms are merged. By assumption, the e±cient investments are not
corner solutions. It follows that
@¦b
1













@g11 > 0: So the merged ¯rm
1 could strictly increase pro¯ts by decreasing g11; and this is not an equilibrium.


















This expression showed that
@¦s
1
@g11 is weakly positive because @F11
@g11 · 0: The strict inequality,
@¦s
1
@g11 > 0; now follows from our assumptions on the distributions: fij(vij;gij) > 0 for vij 2 [0; v];
and for each value of gij; there is an open interval in [0; v] on which @Fij(vij;gij)=@gij < 0. To
see this, let @F11
@g11 < 0 on the interval (a;b): When v12 = a and v21 ¡v22 = b¡a; the bracketed






< 0: By continuity, the bracketed expression is strictly





A similar argument establishes the result that
@¦s
1
@g12 is strictly negative.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The result follows from the fact that a buyer's payo® satis¯es the Vickrey property. The
argument is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3, where the Vickrey property is de¯ned.
Proof of Proposition 6.
At thee±cient investments, we have
@¦b
1
@g11 = 0 becausethe e±cient investmentsare an interior









@g11 >0; so that
the e±cient investment pattern is not an equilibrium when buyer 1 and seller 1 are merged. We
will also show that the sign of
@¦s
1
@g1k is ambiguous for k > 1:








wherev =(v11;:::; vBS) isa realization of buyers valuationsand p1(v) istheminimumcompetitive





























































By assumption, we have@F1k
@g1k ·0:The sign of
@¦s
1
@g1k is therefore determined by the sign of
@p1(v)
@v1k :
We will ¯rst show that
@p1(v)
@v11 ¸ 0 and hence we conclude that
@¦s
1
@g11 ¸ 0: (At the end of the
proof, we argue that the inequality is strict:
@¦s
1
@g11 > 0:). To analyze the term
@p1(v)
@v11 , we will use
the fact that the minimum competitive price p1(v) satis¯es the Vickrey property that a buyer's
payo® is the buyer's marginal contribution to social welfare. From this, we will ¯nd a useful
expression for p1:
Fix a realization of buyers valuations v; and consider an e±cient allocation. A¤(v): The
welfare of the allocation, w(A¤(v)) is a sum of buyers' valuations,
P
vij,where each buyer i
obtains a good from seller j: If seller 1 sells an input, then some buyer i obtains seller 1's input
and w(A¤(v)) = vi1 +
P
vhl, where each buyer h obtains a good from a seller l 6= 1: To compute
buyer i's marginal contribution to surplus, we next assume that buyer i does not purchase an
33input, and given this, consider an allocation A¤
¡i(v) that maximizes welfare. If seller 1 sells an
input to some buyer j, then w(A¤
¡i(v)) = vj1 +
P
vmn where each buyer m obtains a good from
a seller n 6= 1: (If seller 1 does not sell an input in A¤
¡i(v), then p1(v) = 0 because there is no
competition for seller 1's input.) Using the Vickrey property of buyers' payo®s, we write the
buyer i's payo® as






Solving for p1;we have




vhl where n; l 6= 1
Wewant to ¯nd
@p1(v)
@v11 : If wederivetheaboveexpression, weobtain @p1
@v11 = 0 if j 6=1 and @p1
@v11 =1
if j = 1: This suggests that @p1
@v11 is weakly positive. There is a caveat, however. The allocations
A¤(v) and A¤
¡i(v) that underlie the expression for p1(v) may change when v11 changes. However,
the space of valuations v is comprised of regions, such that on each region the allocations A¤(v)
and A¤
¡i(v) are constant. We have showed that
@p1(v)
@v11 is a weakly positive constant on each region
where seller 1 sells an input. If there are any additional regions where seller 1 does not sell an
input, then p1(v) =0 and
@p1(v)
@v11 = 0 on those regions. We have shown that
@p1(v)
@v11 ¸ 0 for all v




@g1k for k ¸ 2. Again, we have that the sign of
@¦s
1
@g1k is determined by the
sign of
@p1(v)





vhl: However, in each sum, v1k occurs at most once. It follows
that
@p1(v)
@v1k 2 f0; 1; ¡1g. Because
@p1(v)




@g1k : In particular, if
@p1(v)




and seller 1 may bene¯t from increase in the external investment gik:
To ¯nish the proof, we must show the strict inequality:
@¦s
1






















@v11 2 f0; 1g: We will we done if we can show that
@p1(v)
@v11 = 1 and
@F11(v11;g11)
@g11 > 0 on a
34set of v with positive measure. This happens,for example, when some buyer k obtains seller 1's
good in the e±cient allocation, but if buyer k were not allowed to obtain a good, then it would
be e±cient for buyer 1 to obtain the good. It is straightforward to construct a set of such v with
positive measure. We assume values of v11 in the open interval where
@F11(v11;g11)
@g11 > 0 and then
construct open intervals of the other values vij consistent with such allocations. Because fij >0
for all vij 2 [0; v];the set will have positive measure.
Note on Di®erentiation and Integration by Parts
Wecan (1) takederivativesunderintegral signs and (2) apply theintegration by parts formula
R
xdy = xy j ¡
R
ydx provided the following conditions are met. The conditions are de¯ned for
integralsovercompact intervals. Our integralsare all of thisform, because of our assumption that
the support of the distributions of the buyers' valuations is bounded. For notational simplicity,
however, we will usually write the upper bound of the integrals as 1:
(1) Consider an integral I(g) =
Rb
a h(v;g)dv where h(v;g) is a measurable function on R =
f(v; g)ja ·v ·b; c ·g ·dg: If theintegral I(g) existsforall g 2 [c; d]; and if thepartial derivative
@h(v;g)
@g is continuous on R; then by Theorem 9-37 of Apostol (p. 196, 1957), the derivative I0(g)





(2) Consider measurable functions x(v) and y(v) de¯ned on an interval a · v · b: If x is
continuous on [a;b] and if y has bounded variation on [a;b], then x is Riemann-integrable with




a ydx = xyjb
a: The
result follows from Theorems 9-6 and 9-26 of Apostol (p. 194 and p. 211, 1957). A second
su±cient condition for the integration by parts result is that y becontinuous and xhave bounded
variation. Bounded variation is a mild condition. For example, piece-wise continuous functions
have bounded variation..
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